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  1Introduction 
  There are many different situations involving moral hazard in groups.  In terms of 
the worker effort problem, some work groups may have excellent information about the 
effort of co-workers (sports teams, production shop floors) while some may not 
(management may not have good information regarding the cost of effort for production 
floor workers and vice versa).  Similarly, some non-point source pollution problems 
involve very similar polluters with excellent information about each other (dairy 
farmers).  Other situations, however, may involve many different types of polluters 
(agricultural, industrial and municipal) who may not have good information about each 
other.  For example, Horan (2001) lists ten different non-point source pollution sites in 
the United States.  Of these, at least two involve different types of sources, and two (one 
of which involves different types of sources) cross state lines.
2 
Many authors discuss and provide refinements to the use of exogenous targeting 
instruments as theoretical solutions to the moral hazard in groups problem (e.g., 
Holmstrom 1982, McAfee and McMilan 1991, Segerson 1988 and Xepapadeas 1992, 
1995).  An exogenous targeting instrument is a contract between a principal and agents, 
which specifies a threshold level of an observable which is correlated with an 
unobservable action which the principal wishes the agents to take.  For the worker effort 
problem, the level of output is the observable which is correlated with the agents’ 
unobservable effort level.  The principal (owner) specifies a level of output and the 
agents (workers) receive a bonus or penalty depending upon whether they produce more 
than the target level of output or not.  For the environmental case the ambient level of 
                                                 
2 Specifically, Chesapeake Bay involves both agricultural and urban sources and Dillon Creek involves 
urban, septic and ski areas. 
  2pollution is often assumed to be the observable which is correlated with the emissions of 
individual polluters.  The principal (environmental regulator) specifies a level of ambient 
pollution and the agents (polluting firms) receive a penalty if the observed level of 
pollution exceeds the target and a bonus if it is below (Segerson 1998). 
    This paper is one in a series that use controlled laboratory experiments to 
provide empirical evidence as to the efficacy of these instruments.  Recent papers by 
Vossler, et al. (2006), Cochard, et al. (2005), and Spraggon (2002, 2004a) suggest that 
exogenous targeting instruments are able to induce groups of individuals to comply with 
a standard under a number of different circumstances.  This includes when subjects have 
heterogeneous payoff functions (Spraggon 2004a) and when subjects are also involved in 
a market (Vossler, et al. 2006).
3  However, these instruments are typically unable to 
induce individuals to make the socially optimal decisions (Spraggon 2004b).  The 
purpose of this experiment is to determine whether the information individuals have 
influences whether or not their decisions correspond with theoretical predictions.  
  The experiment discussed here involves two treatment variables: the information 
condition (full, partial or no information), and the payoff functions (homogeneous or 
heterogeneous).  Under the full information condition subjects know the number of 
people in their group and everyone's payoff function.  This is the information condition 
under which Spraggon (2002, 2004a) were conducted.  Under the partial information 
condition subjects know the number of people in their group but have no information 
about the payoff functions of the other people.  Under the no information condition 
subjects only know their own payoff function and have no information about the number 
                                                 
3 Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) investigate a different exogenous targeting instrument which is unable to 
induce the group to the target outcome. 
  3of people in their group or the payoff functions of the others.  This is similar to the 
information treatment for the threshold public goods experiments investigated in Marks 
and Croson (1999).
4  Although there were no significant effects of information at the 
aggregate level, they observed a greater degree of convergence to the Nash Equilibrium 
in their incomplete information case than in their full or partial information case.   
Rondeau, et al. (1999) investigate information in a one-shot provision point game with 
money back guarantee, a proportional rebate and heterogeneous agents with large groups 
(N=45).  They also find no significant effects at the aggregate level.   As a result, we 
conjecture that under the no information condition subjects will be more likely to choose 
the socially optimal decision over time.  This should result in greater convergence to the 
target outcome.   
The results are consistent with the results of previous experiments (Ledyard 1995, 
and Marks and Croson 1999) in that different information conditions have different 
effects on groups where the subjects have homogenous or heterogeneous payoff 
functions.  Our results suggest the differences here seem to be due to homogenous 
subjects playing more randomly when they know the number of people in the group but 
not their payoff functions, and being more likely to choose numbers below the Nash 
prediction when they have no information.  Whereas, heterogeneous subjects play more 
randomly when they have no information, and are more likely to choose numbers below 
the Nash prediction when they know the number of people in their group.  Thus, reducing 
information seems to result in more sub-optimal play rather than less.  Perhaps more 
importantly, average decisions converge towards the Nash prediction over time for 
                                                 
4 In Marks and Croson’s partial information condition subjects knew the sum of the groups valuation for 
the public good. 
  4subject types whose decisions are in the decision space but not for those whose Nash 
decision is on the boundary of their decision space. 
The Moral Hazard in Groups Experiment 
 
The design of the experiment is based on a standard model of non-point source 
pollution used by Segerson (1988), Malik (1990) and Xepapadeas (1995) and reported in 
Spraggon (2002).
5  Subjects’ decisions are assumed to impose an externality on society.  
The larger the decision number the larger the externality and the higher the subject’s 
payoff up to some maximum decision number.  This part of the subject’s payoff is 
described as their private payoff and is provided to the subjects in a table.
6  It can be 
described by the following function: 
2 max ) ( 002 . 0 25 ) ( n n n n x x x B − − =        ( 1 )  
where  Bn   is the benefit function, xn is the decision number, xn
max is the maximum 
decision number and n indexes the individual subjects (n = 1..6).  This functional form 
and the parameters where chosen for mathematical convenience.   
The primary research question is whether the instruments suggested by Segerson 
(1988) are able to induce individuals to reduce a decision number to the socially optimal 
level.  We look at one specific form of the instrument suggested by Segerson:  The 
tax/subsidy instrument taxes or provides a subsidy to everyone in the group depending on 
the difference between the target aggregate group decision number and the actual group 
decision number.  We refer to the aggregate group decision number as the group total.  
                                                 
5  Nalbantian and Schotter’s (1997) experiment was also used as a model specifically for the number of 
subjects per group and number of periods per session.  This experiment differs from Nalbantian and 
Schotter’s in terms of being framed as a public bad rather than a public good.  See Park (2001) for a 
comparison of these frameworks. 
6 See the instructions included in the appendix. 
  5The instrument is a linear function of the difference between the actual and the target 
group totals. 
         ( 2 )   ) 150 ( 3 . 0 ) ( − = X X T
where T(X) is the group benefit function, X is the aggregate decision number (or group 
total  ), 150 is the target and 0.3 is the tax and subsidy rate.  As a result each 
subject faces the following payoff function: 
∑ = =
6
1 n n x X
) 150 ( 3 . 0 ) ( 002 . 0 25
6
1
2 max − − − − = Π ∑ = n n n n n x x x .     (3) 
This payoff function has a unique maximum at:  .  Thus, the payoff 
maximizing decision is for each subject to reduce their decision number from their 
maximum by seventy-five.  
75
max * − = n n x x
 There are three different subject types.  For the homogeneous sessions all six of 
the subjects are medium capacity: xn
max= 100, xn
*= 25.  For the heterogeneous sessions 
three of the six subjects are large capacity: xn
max= 125, xn
*= 50 and three are small 
capacity subjects: xn
max= 75, xn
*= 0.  It is important to notice that in the experiment 
subjects were constrained to choose numbers between 0 and xn
max.  As a result while large 
and medium capacity subjects can choose numbers above or below the theoretical 
prediction small capacity subjects are only able to choose numbers above the theoretical 
prediction. 
There is also a group optimal solution under this instrument.  If all subjects 
choose zero the payoff of the group is maximized.  This is not a Nash equilibrium as it is 
in each individual’s best interest to reduce their decision number from the maximum by 
seventy-five. 
  6The level of information subjects have about the number and payoffs of other 
people in the group is the treatment variable of interest in this paper.  We investigate 
three different cases:  full information, partial information and no information.  In all 
three cases subjects know their own payoff functions.  Under the full information 
condition subjects know the number of other subjects in their group as well as the payoffs 
of the others in their group.  Under the partial information condition subjects know how 
many people are in their group but do not have information about other’s payoffs.  Under 
the no information condition subjects know neither the number of people in their group 
nor the payoffs of the others. 
This experiment is concerned with data from two separate sources.  Data for the 
full information treatment was collected at one university while the data for the partial 
and no information treatments were collected at a second university.
7  The procedures 
used to conduct the sessions were identical except for the information provided to 
subjects (the treatment variable) and the fact that a session at the first university consisted 
of one group of six subjects while a session at the second university consisted of two 
groups of six subjects.  This was done so that if subjects assumed the other people in the 
room comprised their group in the no information conditions, dividing the target by the 
number of people in the room would not be the Nash equilibrium.  As a result of the 
separate sources for the full information, and no and partial information data emphasis is 
placed on comparing the treatments with theoretical prediction rather than comparing 
across treatments. 
                                                 
7 The names of the universities have been suppressed to protect the anonymity of the authors. 
  7Theoretical Predictions 
 
  The primary questions addressed by this study concern the average level of 
aggregate decision number (group total).  The purpose of these exogenous targeting 
instruments is to reduce the ambient level of pollution to the target level.  As a result, the 
first hypothesis concerns the ability of this instrument to reduce the group total to the 
target level for each of the treatments.  A secondary concern is whether this instrument is 
able to induce individuals to reduce their emissions to the optimal level. 
 Hypothesis 1:  The Tax/Subsidy Instrument will be able to induce the group to the target 
outcome independent of the information condition. 
 
  The Tax/Subsidy instrument induces the optimal decision as a dominant strategy 
regardless of the information that subjects have.  Indeed the less information they have 
about other subjects the more likely they should be to concentrate on their own payoff 
function.  Moreover, the Tax/Subsidy instrument is designed such that the larger the 
deviation from the target outcome the larger the fine and as a result the more likely that 
subjects will go bankrupt and be removed from the group, thereby reducing the group 
total. 
 
Hypothesis 2:   Less information will result in subjects’ decisions being closer to the 
Nash decision. 
 
  This hypothesis comes from the results of the Marks and Croson (1999) study.  
As discussed in the introduction, they found that although on average there was no 
difference across the information conditions they did find greater convergence to the 
Nash equilibrium in the treatments with less information.  If this result transfers over into 
this environment we should observe similar convergence to both the target at the 
aggregate level and the Nash decision numbers at the individual level. 
  8  There are many reasons why decisions may diverge from the Nash equilibrium.  
We are primarily concerned with subjects’ preferences differing from payoff 
maximization, and subjects’ decisions being affected by random error.  We expect that 
when information is removed either the experimental environment becomes simpler and 
so the degree of error is reduced or the reduction in information changes the subjects 
preferences (for example if you do not know that your contributions will benefit 10 other 
people you may not receive as much utility through altruism as if you did have this 
information).
8   
Results  
 
  The results are separated into five sections.  The first two results deal with the 
aggregate decision numbers at the session level and show broadly that information does 
not affect the ability of exogenous targeting instruments to induce groups to choose the 
target outcome.  Next we look at the convergence properties of the aggregate data and 
find some evidence for greater convergence with no information when subjects are 
heterogeneous but not when subjects are homogeneous in terms of their payoff functions.  
Results 4 and 5 look at the means and convergence of the data at the individual level.  
Again the results vary by information and heterogeneity but the results of the small 
capacity subjects, for whom the theoretically predicted decision lies on the boundary of 
their decision space, differ systematically from the other two subject types. 
 
Result 1:  Information has no effect on the aggregate decision number. 
Table 1 suggests that aggregate decision numbers for heterogeneous groups significantly 
exceed the target level (at the 10% significance level) for both the no information and full 
                                                 
8 See Goeree, et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of altruism. 
  9information treatment.  For the partial information with heterogeneity treatment we also 
observe aggregate decision numbers which exceed the target on average but the variance 
is too high to support the hypothesis that the average exceeds the target.
9 This is 
consistent with previous results (Marks and Croson 1999) which suggest that information 
does not effect the data at the aggregate level, but inconsistent with hypothesis 2. 
Table 1: Mean Group Total by Treatment 
 
































Each cell contains mean, standard error and frequency.  An * indicates that the Group  
Total is significantly different from 150 at the 10% level. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the average group totals over the three sessions in each cell.  Notice 
that both for heterogeneous (Figure 1) and homogeneous (Figure 2) groups there is not 
much difference between the lines representing the average group total in any of the 
periods. 
  This supports Hypothesis 1 in that the information that individuals have about the 
other participants under the tax/subsidy instrument does not have any significant effects 
on the ability of this instrument to reduce the aggregate decision number to the target.   
 
                                                 
9 The statistical analysis here is based on a standard t-test using the standard error calculated across the 
mean values from the three sessions in each cell.  For heterogeneous groups p-value for the test that the 
mean is not equal to 150 is 0.0620, 0.3958 and 0.0906 for no, partial and full information respectively.   
  10Result 2:  There are reductions in efficiencies due to both heterogeneity and information. 
 
  Efficiency is defined as the change in the value of the social planner’s problem as 
a percentage of the optimal change in the social planner’s problem.  In this experiment 
the social planner’s problem is to maximize the producer’s payoffs minus the social cost 
of pollution: 





2 max ∑ ∑ = = − − − =
n n n n n x x x SP .    (4) 








=         ( 5 )  
where SPActual is the actual value of the social planner’s problem given the choices of the 
subjects, SPStatusQuo is the value of the social planner’s problem if all of the subjects 
choose their maximum decision (xn
max) and SPOptimal is the value of the social planner’s 
problem if all of the subjects choose their optimal decision (xn
*).  The value of efficiency 
ranges between 0 and 1 and is represented in Table 2 as a percentage.  Notice that there 
are real differences in efficiency across the treatments.  The heterogeneous groups have 
lower efficiencies and no and partial information sessions have lower efficiencies than 
the full information sessions.  Also notice that heterogeneous groups have lower 
efficiencies under the no information condition while homogeneous groups have the 
lowest efficiency under partial information.   
The differences in efficiency which are not observed in the group total can be 
explained by variability in the individual decisions and the fact that efficiency takes into 
account the costs of reducing the decision number.  Thus a heterogeneous group who all 
choose 25 would have a group total of 150 but an efficiency of 88.9.  Clearly both 
  11heterogeneity and reductions in information reduce efficiency.  Moreover, we observe 
different effects of information on groups with homogeneous and heterogeneous payoff 
functions as observed for public goods (Ledyard 1995). 
Table 2: Mean Efficiencies by Treatment 
 
Information 








































Each cell contains the efficiency as a percentage, standard deviation and frequency. 
            
 
Result 3: Convergence of the group total differs across treatment. 
 
  Marks and Croson (1999) use a random effects regression with period and period 
squared to show greater convergence to the Nash outcome for their aggregate data.  We 
combine this model with an asymptotic convergence model suggested by Noussair, et al. 
(1995).  The Noussair, et al. asymptotic model uses the inverse of period to estimate the 
asymptotic starting value and (period-1)/period to estimate the asymptotic ending value.   
Thus the model we estimate for each treatment is: 
Group Totalit = β1ti + β2ti
2 + β3(1/ti) + β4(ti-1)/ti  + ui + Єit.    (6) 
where i indexes the group and t indexes the period, ui is a group specific error term and 
Єit is the standard error term.   
  12  Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients from these regressions.  Figures 3 and 
4 depict the average decision, the prediction from the regression model and the 
confidence intervals based on the standard error from the regressions for each of the 
treatments.  Figure 3 presents these results for the heterogeneous groups.  Notice that 
aggregate decision is converging to the target in terms of both level and variance for the 
no information treatment.  However, aggregate decisions for the partial and full 
information treatments are both rising and becoming more variable over time.   Table 4, 
which presents the actual and predicted average group total for period 1 and period 25, 
confirms these observations.   Figure 4 presents these results for homogeneous groups.  
Among homogeneous groups aggregate decisions are very similar to the target.  The full 
information sessions have the lowest variance at the end of the session.  Table 4 confirms 
this and suggests that the variances are not much different between the heterogeneous and 
homogeneous sessions. 
 
  Thus, our results are consistent with Marks and Croson (1999) who find greater 
convergence in their incomplete information case for the heterogeneous case.  However, 
this result does not carry over to the case where subjects are homogeneous in terms of 
their payoffs.
10 
                                                 
10 Marks and Croson (1999) only investigate groups with heterogeneous endowments. 
  13Table 3: Combined Model 
 
 Heterogeneous  Homogeneous 
 No  Info  Partial 
Info  Full Info  No Info  Partial 

































































































Group Totalit = β1(1/ti) + β2(ti-1)/ti  + β3ti + β4ti
2 + ui + Єit.  Each cell contains the estimated coefficient, 
standard error and p-value.  
*Prob > X




[Table 4 about here] 
 
Result 4: Individual decision making varies across treatments and capacity.   
 
  Recall that equation (3) suggests that there is a unique payoff maximizing 
dominant strategy for each of the subject types.  This predicts that large capacity subjects 
will choose 50, medium capacity subjects will choose 25 and small capacity subjects will 
choose 0.  Table 5 reports the mean, median, standard error and frequency of the decision 
numbers by subject type across information treatment.  Notice that the decision numbers 
are lower than the payoff maximizing decision number for large and higher for the small 
capacity subjects in all cases. 
Also notice in table 5 that the medians for large capacity subjects are well below the 
prediction, medians are below for the medium capacity subjects expect under full 
information where they are equal to the prediction and medians are above the prediction 
  14for small capacity subjects.  This suggests that for the homogeneous groups, subjects 
choose slightly lower numbers with less information, while for heterogeneous groups the 
decision numbers are lower under partial information than they are under full information 
but are slightly higher under no information. 
Table 5: Average and Median Decisions by Treatment 
 
Subject Type  No 
Information  Partial Information  Full Information 























































Each cell in the Mean columns contain the mean of subjects decision number, standard error and number of 
observations. Decisions of subjects who were bankrupt were eliminated.  An * indicates that the mean 
differs from the Nash prediction at the 5% level. 
 
Distributions of individual decisions are presented in Figures 5, 6, and 7 for large, 
medium and small capacity subjects respectively.  For the large capacity subjects (Figure 
5) notice that for all treatments, most of the decisions are well below the Nash prediction.  
There is a larger peak under full information at 25 and under partial information at 14, 
while decisions seem to be much more random under no information.  For the medium 
capacity subjects (Figure 6) the obvious peak at the Nash prediction under full 
information is noticeably absent under no and partial information.  For medium capacity 
subjects under both no and partial information, the modal decision falls to zero.  Notice 
for medium capacity subjects decisions seem to be more random under partial 
  15information.  For the small capacity subjects (Figure 7) the modal decision is zero in all 
three treatments but the peak is highest for partial information and almost non-existent 
under no information.  Thus subjects with heterogeneous payoff functions (large and 
small capacity) behave more randomly when they have no information, while the subjects 
with homogeneous payoff functions behave more randomly when they know the number 
of people in the group but not their payoff functions (partial information). 
 
Result 5: Convergence in Individual Decisions. 
  Next we address whether the decision numbers converge towards the Nash 
decision over time.  Table 6 presents the combined convergence model discussed for 
aggregate decisions in Result 3, estimated by subject type and information on the 
individual decisions: 
Decisionit = β1(1/ti) + β2(ti-1)/ti  + β3ti + β4ti
2 + ui + Єit    (7) 
where i indexes subject, t indexes period, ui is the individual specific random effect and 
Єit is the standard error term.  Figures 8 through 10 show the time series of average 
decisions, the prediction and the confidence interval based on the regression for each 
treatment.  Figure 8 shows that for large capacity subjects all of the treatments are 
generally close to the theoretical prediction.  Decisions seem to be converging towards 
the Nash prediction for full and partial information.  For partial information, variance 
seems to be rising over time.  For no information decisions are generally below the 
theoretical prediction for large capacity subjects.  Table 7 presents actual and predicted 
average decision and standard errors by treatment for periods 1 and 25.  Standard errors 
are generally larger under the partial information treatment but there is no indication that 
  16they are smaller under full information than they are under no information.  Figure 9 
shows that the decisions of medium capacity subjects are generally close to the Nash 
prediction with the variance being higher in both the no and partial information 
treatments.  Table 7 confirms that the variances are smaller under full information than 
they are under the other two information conditions for medium capacity subjects.  Figure 
10 shows that the decisions of small capacity subjects are always well above the 
prediction and there is no indication of convergence towards this prediction in any of the 
information treatments.  Table 7 suggests that the decision numbers are generally higher 
under no information and variance is a bit smaller under partial information.   
Table 6: Asymptotic Convergence for Individual Decisions 
  Large Capacity  Small Capacity  Medium Capacity 























































































































































Decisionit = β1(1/ti) + β2(ti-1)/ti  + β3ti + β4ti
2 + ui + Єit.  Each cell contains the estimated coefficient, 
standard error and p-value.  
*Prob > X
2* is the p-value for the joint test that all of the coefficients are equal 
to zero. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
That large capacity subjects consistently reduce their decision numbers below the 
Nash predictions is concerning as it results in these subjects experiencing more 
  17bankruptcies (Table 8, and the number of non-bankruptcy observations for large capacity 
subjects (185 for no and 218 for partial information)).   
This inequality also appears in the final or cumulative payoffs.  Table 9 presents 
these cumulative payoffs by information and subject capacity.
11  Notice that under the no 
information condition, the medium capacity subjects make more profit than both the large 
and the small capacity subjects, while in the other two cases the small capacity subjects 
make the highest payoffs at the expense of the large capacity subjects.  This coupled with 
the observation that small capacity subjects are much more likely to choose the Nash 
equilibrium decision (0) under partial information is an interesting result.  When 
heterogeneous subjects have no information they seem to play more randomly, when they 
know the number of people in their group (but nothing about payoffs) all subjects seem to 
be more likely to choose lower decisions and indeed the Nash decision in the small 
capacity subjects case.  Whereas, homogeneous subjects seem to be more likely to choose 
lower decision numbers under the no information treatment and play more randomly in 
the partial information condition. 
Table 8: Bankruptcies by Session 
 
Information 



























Each cell contains the number of subject decision periods where subjects were bankrupt for each treatment, 
and the total number of subject decision periods. 
                                                 
11 Subjects were also paid a $5 (Cdn.) show up fee but this amount is excluded from the payoffs reported in 
Table 9. 
  18Table 9 Cumulative Payoffs (in Canadian Dollars) by Session 
 
Subject Type  No Information  Partial 
Information 
Full 






















































  Even though information has no effect on the aggregate decision number it does 
have an adverse effect on efficiency in a controlled laboratory moral hazard in group 
experiment. These effects of efficiency signal effects of information on individual 
decision making.  For subjects with heterogeneous payoff functions, partial information 
(knowing the number of subjects in the group but not their payoffs) results in subjects 
playing lower decision numbers, while having no information results in heterogeneous 
subjects playing more randomly.  The reverse is true for homogeneous subjects.  They 
seem to choose lower numbers than predicted under no information and play more 
randomly under partial information. This differential effect is consistent with previous 
experimental results (Ledyard 1995) and goes a step towards providing an explanation for 
the observed differences in outcome.  The results also show that decisions adjust towards 
the Nash prediction except for small capacity subjects whose theoretically predicted 
decision is on the boundary of their decision space.   
  19Clearly, the results suggest the importance of participants in an Exogenous 
Targeting Instrument regime being fully informed of how they are expected to behave 
and the consequences from deviating from this behaviour.  Moreover, steps must be taken 
to ensure that firms are unable to use these instruments in order to impose significant 
monetary costs on their competitors by not complying when their competitors choose to 
do so. 
The results are also suggestive that subjects find this environment very 
challenging and when the potential to use simple heuristics are removed they play more 
randomly or risk aversely.  This suggests future work in which the instructions are clearer 
with respect to the purpose of the instrument.  Moreover, it may prove worthwhile to 
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externalities” Journal of Public Economics, 56, 485-498.Table 4: Predicted and Actual Aggregate Decisions by Treatment, Period 1 and Period 25. 
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Each cell contains mean and (standard error) of the group total.  * indicates that the mean is significantly different from 150 at the 
10% level. 
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Table 7: Predicted and Actual Decisions by Treatment, Period 1 and Period 25. 
 
  No Information  Partial Information  Full Information 
  Actual Predicted Actual Predicted Actual Predicted 





















































































































Each cell contains mean, standard error and number of observations.period
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Figure 1: Average Group Totals by Treatment and Period, Heterogeneous Agents. 
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Figure 2: Average Group Totals by Treatment and Period, Homogeneous Agents.
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Figure 3:  Average Group Totals with Predictions and Confidence Intervals from Regression, by Treatment, Heterogeneous Agents. 
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Figure 6: Distributions of Individual Decisions for Medium Capacity Subjects, by 
Information. 
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Figure 10:  Average Decisions, Predictions and Confidence intervals from regression, Small Capacity Subjects.
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Appendix B- Instructions 
 
This appendix is a compilation of the instructions are presented to the subjects.  Comments, in 
italics, have been inserted to point out the differences between the treatments.  The first part was 





This is a session in an experiment in the economics of decision making. During this 
session your payoffs will be reported in lab dollars.   It is possible that you could lose money in 
this session.  As a result everyone will be given an opening balance of 250 lab dollars.  If at 
anytime your cumulative payoff (which includes this opening balance) falls below 0 lab dollars 
you will be excused from this part of the session.   Despite this if you follow the instructions 
carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money.  This research is being funded by the 





Today’s session will be conducted using the computer network located in our laboratory.  
The session will consist of 2 parts which will each last 25 periods.  We will begin after everyone 
has finished reading the instructions and completed 5 practice periods.  Please refrain from 
talking during the session. Each period will proceed as follows. 
 
 
What the Computer does 
 








Choose a “decision number” 
and enter it in the appropriate 
box on your computer screen. 
 
Collect decision numbers, Calculates 






Check your payoff and 
cumulative payoff 
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Part 1 
 
Full information, homogeneous payoff functions. 
 
You have been assigned to a group of six (yourself and five other) participants.  This will 
be your group for the entire session.  Everyone in your group has the same instructions.  This 
part will consist of 25 periods.  In each period you (and the others in your group) will be asked to 
choose a number between 0 and 100 and to enter it into the computer.  This is your Decision 
Number.   
 
Full information, heterogeneous payoff functions and Partial Information. 
 
You have been assigned to a group of six (yourself and five other) participants.  This will 
be your group for the entire session.   This part will consist of 25 periods.  In each period you 
(and the others in your group) will be asked to choose a number and to enter it into the computer.  




You have been assigned to a group of participants.  This will be your group for the entire 
session.   This part will consist of 25 periods.  In each period you (and the others in your group) 
will be asked to choose a number and to enter it into the computer.  This is your Decision 




Your Total Payoff for each period is the sum of your Private Payoff and your Group Payoff: 
 
Total Payoff = Private Payoff + Group Payoff 
 
Full information, homogeneous payoff function. 
 
Your Private Payoff depends only on your own Decision Number.  Table 1 in your folder 
shows the Private Payoff for each possible Decision Number.  For example if your Decision 
Number were 60 Table 1 shows that your Private Payoff would be 21.80 lab dollars.  Or if you 
had chosen 30 your Private Payoff would be 15.20 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your 
Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff. 
 
Full information, heterogeneous payoff function. 
 Your Private Payoff depends only on your own Decision Number.  You have been 
randomly assigned to a player type.  Half (3) of the people in your group must choose 
their Decision Number between 0 and 125.  The other half of the people in your group 
must choose their Decision Number between 0 and 75.  The payoffs are also different for 
both types of people so that the Private payoff to choosing 10 for people whose decision 
numbers can range between 0 and 125 is different than the payoff to choosing 10 for 
people whose decision number can range between 0 and 75.  
 
Table 1 in your folder shows the Private Payoff for each of your possible Decision 
Numbers.  For example if you were to choose 30 Table 1 shows your Private Payoff for 
choosing that Decision Number.   
 
If your Decision Numbers must be less than 125 Table 1 shows you that your Private 
Payoff for choosing 30 would be 6.95 lab dollars.  
 
If your Decision Numbers must be less than 75 Table 1 shows you that your Private 
Payoff for choosing 30 would be 20.95 lab dollars.   
 
Notice that the higher your Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff. 
 
Table 2 in your folder shows the Private Payoffs for each of the possible Decision 
Numbers for someone of the other type.  For example Table 2 shows the Private Payoff 
to a participant of the other type who chose 30.   
 
If the participant of the other type’s Decision Numbers are always less than 75 then Table 
2 shows that their Private Payoff for choosing 30 is 20.95 lab dollars.   
 
Or, if the participant of the other type’s Decision Numbers are always less than 125 Table 
2 shows their Private Payoff for choosing 30 is 6.95 lab dollars.   
 




Your Private Payoff depends only on your own Decision Number.  Table 1 in 
your folder shows the Private Payoff for each of your possible Decision Numbers.  For 
example if you were to choose 30 Table 1 shows that your Private Payoff for choosing 
that Decision Number is 6.95 lab dollars.   
 
Notice that the higher your Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff. 
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in the group. If the Group Total is less than or equal to 150 then the Group Payoff will be 
a positive value equal to 30% of the difference between 150 and the Group Total.  If the 
Group Total is greater than 150, the Group Payoff is a negative value equal to 30% of the 
difference between 150 and the Group Total.  The Group Payoff can be written as the 
following function of the Group Total: 
 
Group Payoff =  0.3*( 150 - Group Total )  if Group Total > 150 
  {  0.3*( 150 - Group Total )  if Group Total ≤ 150   
 
For example if the Group Total were 170 then the Group Payoff for every member of the 
group would be 0.3*(150 - 170) =  -6.00 lab dollars.  Similarly if the Group Total were 
140 then the Group Payoff for every member of the group would be 0.3*(150-140) = 3.00 
lab dollars.  Notice that the higher the Group Total the lower the Group Payoff.    
 
Full information, homogeneous payoff functions. 
 
As a simple example, suppose that you chose 30, and everyone else in your group 
chose 20.  The Group Total would be 130 (the sum of your decision number and the 
decision numbers of everyone else in your group), your Private Payoff would be 15.20, 
the Group Payoff would be 6.00, and your Total Payoff would be 21.20 lab dollars. 
 
Now suppose, that you had chosen 70 in the above example.  The Group Total 
would be 170, your Private Payoff 23.20, the Group Payoff would be -6.00, and your 
Total Payoff would be 17.20 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number 
the higher your Private Payoff.  But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the 
Group Total and the lower the Group Payoff. 
 
Full information, heterogeneous payoff functions. 
 
As a simple example, suppose that you chose 30, and everyone else in your group 
chose 20.  The Group Total would be 130 (the sum of your decision number and the 
decision numbers of everyone else in your group), your Private Payoff would be 6.95 if 
your decision numbers must be less than 125 and 20.95 if your decision numbers must be 
less than 75, the Group Payoff would be 6.00, and your Total Payoff would be 12.95 if 
your decision numbers are always less than 125, and 26.95 lab dollars if your decision 
numbers are always less than 75. 
 
Now suppose, that you had chosen 70 in the above example.  The Group Total 
would be 170, your Private Payoff 18.95 if your decision numbers are always below 125 
and 24.95 if your decision numbers are always below 75, the Group Payoff would be -
6.00, and your Total Payoff would be 12.95 or 18.95 lab dollars depending on what type 
you are.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number the higher your Private Payoff.  
But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the Group Total and the lower the 
Group Payoff. 
 
                                                                       36Partial Information. 
 
As a simple example, suppose that you chose 30, and everyone else in your group 
chose 20.  The Group Total would be 130 (the sum of your decision number and the 
decision numbers of everyone else in your group), your Private Payoff would be 6.95, the 
Group Payoff would be 6.00, and your Total Payoff would be 12.95 lab dollars. 
 
Now suppose, that you had chosen 70 in the above example.  The Group Total 
would be 170, your Private Payoff 18.94, the Group Payoff would be -6.00, and your 
Total Payoff would be 12.95 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number 
the higher your Private Payoff.  But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the 




As a simple example, suppose that you chose 30, and that the sum of the decision 
numbers of everyone else in your group was 100.  The Group Total would be 130 (the 
sum of your decision number and the decision numbers of everyone else in your group), 
your Private Payoff would be 20.95, the Group Payoff would be 6.00, and your Total 
Payoff would be 26.95 lab dollars. 
 
Now suppose, that you had chosen 70 in the above example.  The Group Total 
would be 170, your Private Payoff 24.95, the Group Payoff would be -6.00, and your 
Total Payoff would be 18.95 lab dollars.  Notice that the higher your Decision Number 
the higher your Private Payoff.  But, the higher your Decision Number the higher the 
Group Total and the lower the Group Payoff. 
 
Full and partial information. 
 
Your payment for this session will be the sum of your earnings in each of the 25 
periods.  Your earnings will be converted from lab dollars to Canadian at the rate of 1 lab 
dollar is equal to 2 1/2 cents Canadian.  In the event that you do lose your opening 
balance you will be informed by the computer that you are Bankrupt and will not be able 
to participate in the rest of this part of the experiment.  At this point the rest of the people 
in your group will be informed that there is now one less person whose decision number 




Your payment for this session will be the sum of your earnings in each of the 25 
periods.  Your earnings will be converted from lab dollars to Canadian at the rate of 1 lab 
dollar is equal to 2 1/2 cents Canadian.  In the event that you do lose your opening 
balance you will be informed by the computer that you are Bankrupt and will not be able 
to participate in the rest of this part of the experiment.  
 
All treatments. 
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Please answer the following question: 
 
Use TABLE 1 to fill in the portion of the record sheet below assuming that you chose 65, 
the Group Total was 400 and the group payoff is 30% of the difference between 150 and 
the Group Total if the Group Total is above 150 and 30% of the difference between 150 





































Please raise your hand when you are done so that the monitor can check your answer. 
 
Before we begin we will conduct five practice periods.  These practice periods are 
intended to help you understand today’s experiment.  Any earnings you make during the 
practice periods will not be included in your payment at the end of the session.  The 
practice periods will differ from the actual periods in that the Group Total will be your 
decision number plus a random number chosen by the computer.  The Group Total in the 
practice periods will be your decision number plus a random number between 0 and 500.  
This random number is chosen by the computer so that each number between and 
including 0 and 500 has an equal chance of being selected. 
 
Once the first practice period starts you will notice that the game window on the 
computer screen has four sections.  The first section describes the Group Payoff function.  
This function is the same as described in the instructions above.  The second section is 
labelled Scratch Pad.  Using the Scratch Pad, you will be able to determine your payoff 
from different combinations of values for your Decision Number and the Group Total.  
Notice that you can change the Decision Number and the Group Total by typing numbers 
into the edit boxes or by using the arrow buttons located beside the edit boxes.  Also 
notice that changing the Decision Number changes the Group Total.  This is because the 
Group Total is the sum of your Decision Number, the Decision Numbers of those in your 
group and the random number and as a result when your Decision Number increases so 
does the Group Total.  The third section of the screen is where you type your Decision 
Number.  Once you have chosen your Decision Number and typed it into the edit box 
click on the Ok button to complete this part of the period.  The fourth section of the 
screen contains two tabs which allow you to switch between the main screen and the 
history screen.  If you click on the tab labelled history you will be able to see the outcome 
of all of the previous period in which you have participated.  Please feel free to raise your 
hand and ask any questions you may have. 
 
To help you understand the Scratch Pad please pick any valid decision number 
and type it into the box beside Your Decision Number on the scratch pad.  Now pick a 
bigger number and type it into the box beside Group Total.  Notice that the Group Total 
will always be bigger than your Decision Number as it is the sum of the Decision 
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Numbers of everyone in your group.  Now use the arrow buttons beside the box where 
you typed Your Decision Number to increase or decrease Your Decision Number.  Notice 
the effect of these changes on your Total Payoff. 
 
Once the practice periods have been completed we will begin the 25 periods for 
which you will be paid at the end of today’s session. 